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Ⅰ　Introduction
This paper aims to examine the Banking Union proposed as an efective 
resolution for recent Eurozone debt crisis, and to analyze the reform of Europe’s 
financial supervisory system. First, it investigates structural problems within the 
European Economic and Monetary Union. Particularly, it places the Franco-German 
relationship at the centre, and tries to relate the historical viewpoint on monetary 
union to the curent situation. Second, it analyses the ideals and concrete proposals 
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for the Banking Union submited by European Commission in terms of comparative 
feasibility. Third, it considers solutions for the Eurozone’s curent financial and 
sovereign debt crisis from a comprehensive view including financial supervision.
The Eurozone’s 18 countries are required, under the‘non-standard measures’ 
implemented under the ECB’s (European Central Bank) single monetary policy, to 
more strictly restrain their budgetary planning. As a result, member countries’ 
budgetary polices are shifting drasticaly to‘re-strengthening of discipline’as a 
reflection of the sovereign debt crisis. At this time, the unification of financial 
regulation, also known as‘homogenizing’, is also curtailing individual member 
states’ability to set up individual budgetary policies. In recent years, the ESRB 
(European Systemic Risk Board) and the  ESFS (European System of Financial 
Supervision) were launched as organizations that mandate both the micro-and 
macro-prudential policies using both the cross-section method and a uniform 
method. This approach is based on‘de Larosière Report’submited in February 
2009. However, these might change in future. On the other hand, the international 
monetary system is facing high uncertainty in two domains, namely financial 
conditions and fiscal conditions. Tensions exist between the‘market’and‘nation-
states’. On the one hand, market pressures have increased due to, high openness of 
the Eurozone’s government bond market folowing the global financial crisis. On 
the other hand, circumstances also increase governments’need to reflect‘public 
opinion’. In this context, this paper sheds light on three points as a possible 
resolution for the curent Eurozone crisis. These points are of folowing hierarchy: 
monetary policy, financial supervision and fiscal and economic policies that include 
structural reform. The paper particularly focuses on financial supervision, the 
second point. In recent years, an unprecedented motivation has emerged to utilize 
financial supervision to tackle the Eurozone’s sovereign debt crisis. Through a 
process of discussion and revision, it has moved from an ideal closer to practice. I 
analyze this process from the viewpoint of Banking Union first submited in June 
2012 by the European Commission.
In addition, the Archives de la Banque de France are also used in developing the 
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analytical framework. My research also draws on a series of discussions held the 
honorary and curent director general of the Banque de France, the practical 
specialists of European Commission in Brussels and academic scholars in UK and 
Luxembourg from 2013 to 2014.
Ⅱ　Structural points of the European Economic and Monetary Union
1. Background of this article: a viewpoint on recent trends
We put forth the proposal of a Banking Unioni) in the European Union as a key 
solution for the curent Eurozone crisis (European sovereign debt crisis). One key 
background point to note is the importance of financial supervision, which is 
becoming more important and policies more efective not only within nation-states 
but also for various markets. So far, though, the major reform of financial 
supervision and financial regulation have been dealt with simply as another 
dimension in the discussion of the problems facing the euro; in recent years, these 
have been addressed at the European Union-level by focusing on unifying financial 
supervision, particularly over the banking sector. On central pilar of such reform is 
the proposal for a Banking Union.
As of 2013, Banking Union remained a mere proposal, but it has relatively high 
feasibility. In fact, on 12 September 2013, it was finaly passed by the European 
Parliament (EP), a significant step in the curent situation. Nowadays, the Creation 
of the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) is concrete, despite concerns from 
Germany and Finland about inappropriate concentration and the mandate for single 
banking supervision; although, the fact remains that the EP permited the proposal. 
On the day it passed, European Commission President Baroso and Commissioner 
Barnier made statements stressing that atention should now urgently turn from 
creation of the SSM to developing an SRM (Single Resolution Mechanism)i).
Certainly, it is evident that this plan has been developed fuly and carefuly by the 
multi-dimension view presented in the proposal paper and subsequent revision. So it 
has become a way of proceeding worthy of the European Union, showing its 
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characteristic accumulation of‘acquis-communautaire’. 
In general, the substantial problem of the EU’s debt crisis is a‘fiscal’mater; 
however, member countries have retained control of their sovereign financial 
supervisory systems as wel as budgetary policy. However, banking crises should be 
de-linked from sovereign crises as soon as possible. One possible mechanism is 
fiscal union.
Several important financial, monetary and regulatory maters were extensively 
discussed at the October 2012, Annual Meeting of IMF-WBG held in Tokyo. Special
‘Program of Seminarsii)’focused on, for example, 1) Sovereign Risk, Capital 
Markets and Financial Stability: The Interconnections and 2) Restoring Public Debt: 
Sustainability in a High-Risk Environment. Mr. Carlo Cotarely, Director, Fiscal 
Afairs Department, IMF, stressed the importance of ‘fiscal union’. This led to the 
realization that the solution to the EU’s fiscal problem has already been devised―
simply by a diferent organization working at a diferent economic scale. However, 
much of the discussions that have occured at the IMF-WBG level need to be 
discussed and approved at the G20 level; in other words, the level of EU political 
decision making, rather than imposed from above. Indeed, public opinion is 
growing on the point that it is a substantial and significant problem for policies 
decided by independent (on ideals) bodies such as Central Bank and IMF can 
efectively overule the political level. It is essential for stabilizing international 
financial architecture so that the practical methods and contents are transfered to 
the political level (democratic understanding).
In addition, we should recognise that conflict and compromise wil always occur 
between the EU/Eurozone level and member states level, which shows the 
diference between‘ideal and vision’and‘implementation’(Figure 1). This point 
was presented by Mr. Didier Bruneel (Honorary Director General of Banque de 
France) in discussion with author in Paris in February and September 2013. 
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2. Historical perspective on the Franco-German relationship
When analysing the structure of European monetary integration, the perspectives 
should be examined of both France and Germany, the core countries toward the 
monetary integration. The curent Eurozone crisis is the first huge problem for 
European countries since 1999 and the achievement of monetary integration. This 
crisis is not a‘curency crisis’, which had occured in Europe in 1992-93 as EMS 
crises, but a‘budgetary crisis’and‘sovereign crisis’. Today’s crisis is also a 
‘banking crisis’, which is a central reason for the‘banking union proposal’.
In 1970s, folowing several curency crises, the‘snake’system was destabilized 
because France, as a core country, sufered from speculators seling francs and the 
pressure of higher interest rates. France was forced to exit from the snake in January 
1974, returning in July 1975 only to re-exit in March 1976. In the economic 
situation of stagflation, France injected unstable movement into European monetary 
cooperation. However, folowing reforms spearheaded by Raymond Bare, who 
assumed the post of French prime minister in the mid 1970s, French policies were 
similar to German policiesiv). Such an alignment process continued, with exception 
of‘the experiment of Miterand’, under the‘Mauroy Plan’in 1982 and the‘Delors 
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Plan’in 1983. By 1986, the change in policy direction was already bearing resultsv).
The EMS (European Monetary System) was actualy founded in 1978 by two 
significant agreements, namely the Bremen Accord and the Brussels Resolution. 
The EMS consists of three pilars; ERM (Exchange Rate Mechanism), ECU 
(European Curency Unit) and EMCF (European Monetary Cooperation Fund, or 
FECOM, to use the French abbreviation). In particular, FECOM’s role had been 
inherited by EFSF (European Financial Stability Facility) after the euro’s 
introduction (in the sovereign debt crisis), and has been succeeded by the ESM 
(European Stability Mechanism), which started in October 2012. The character of 
‘fund’, which plays an important part as a‘short-term facility’or‘fund supply’, has 
been to keep a universal value through social history.
As a prerequisite of the above two agreements, in August 1978, the European 
Council in Copenhagen made an agreement in principle of the need for monetary 
stability in Europe. On that basis, the agenda in the above Bremen Conference in 
July 1978 focused on only monetary maters. The European Council approved the 
outline of EMS together with describing its principle and advanced the integration 
of the above-mentioned FECOM to EMF (European Monetary Fund). Furthermore, 
plans were made to implement in this process within two years of the inauguration 
of the EMS (1979-81). However, concerns were raised that this posed too short of a 
time period to implement such an ambitious program of integration.
However, as a result, even though the Brussels Resolution in December 1978 
oficialy established the EMS, the European Council had no choice but to renounce 
proposals requiring meeting the 1981 deadline to set FECOM in the EMF. This also 
reflects disagreements between member states over the EMF’s character and 
organizationvi).
When examining the particular history of France and Germany in respect to the 
above policy failure, we should keep the three folowing points in mind regarding 
French political development in the history of European monetary integration: (1) 
France’s tactics in European monetary integration and its interaction with the 
Franco-Germany or Franco-American relationship, (2) within France’s relationship 
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with Germany, the consequences of conflict and/or compromise with the 
Bundesbank during monetary integration and (3) within France’s relationship with 
America, its appearance of competing several times with the US in its proposal of 
international financial systemic reform. France put forward proposals on the return 
to the gold standard in 1960s, a policy presented by Jacques Ruef, Valéry Giscard 
d’Estaing, on reform of international financial architecture in the middle of 1980s, 
and on the unification of  the‘Palais Royal Group’after global financial crisis in 
2008. In particular, Banque de France took the initiative and published a‘Financial 
Stability Review’, which consisted of a technical analysis by the governors of the 
main central banks. These activities indicate France’s influence as a state possessing 
the power to present proposals to international society. 
On the contrary, with regard to Germany, as a significant core country that has 
efective power over the convergence of policies in Eurozone member states, we 
could note the three folowing points. They are in line with developments on the 
road to monetary union that, (1) the Bundesbank has more original theories than the 
German government, (2) a decision was made to discard the mark as a stable 
curency and (3) it clearly appeared that‘monetarism’, which atached a high value 
to M3, has been chosen since the late 1970s. In terms of the curent Eurozone crisis, 
some diferences between Germany and other member states are unavoidable, and 
indeed, are vital (however, some states are similar to the German stance). This point 
particularly emerges when  examining the dificulty gaining agreement as to the 
feasibility of the curent Stability Bond (Eurozone common bond) proposal. On the 
other hand, TSCG (Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance) was agreed 
on 2 March 2012; however, Mr. François Holande was sworn in as the new 
President of the French Republic, Europe faced a complicated situation including 
the requirement of new policies on growth and employment.
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3. The importance of completion of the free capital movement and the 
　recognition of inter-community disequilibrium in the EC: regional
　imbalances
The Archives de la Banque de France reveal several interesting historical points 
regarding this article’s theme. One such example is the importance of‘the free 
movement of capital’. In the late 1980s, the authorities’recognition of this point is 
reflected in the popularity of the‘la libération complète des mouvements de 
capitaux’, namely the complete liberalization of capital movement, in the records of 
the commitee of governors of EEC central banks (Procès-verbal de la 223e séance 
du Comité des Gouverneurs des Banque Centrales des États membres de la 
Communauté Économique Européenne, tenue à Bâle, le mardi 8 mars 1988vi). In 
addition, the Groupe d’experts présidé par M. Raymond (1987) and Groupe d’
experts présidé par M. Dalgaard (1988), two documents writen by experts groups in 
the commitee of governors of EEC central banks, show that the problem on 
liberalization of capital movement was recognized at the highest levels. 
Furthermore, Mr. de Larosière said that as the free movement of capital in the 
Community was a vital purpose and it constituted a fundamental part of 
development of the single market, then France regarded this step as ireversible. 
In addition, the French archives also shed light on the issue of‘regional balance’, 
or,‘les déséquilibrés intracommunautaires de balances des paiements’, revealing 
that concern over this issue in the documents of the research department of Banque 
de France on 23 November 1989vii). The surplus countries at the time were 
Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium/Luxembourg and Ireland, while deficit 
countries were France, Denmark, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece and United 
Kingdom. This situation is similar to the curent status. The mater of imbalances in 
the Community’s curent account depends on competition and industrial structure, 
rendering it impossible to resolve in the short-term. On the contrary, an efective 
solution needs to utilize the diferences and diversity in the region.
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Ⅲ　The structure of a Banking Union and its impact
1. Prerequisite of a Banking Union: current framework of the financial
　 supervisory system
This chapter examines the system of financial supervision, which is curently 
conducted by several bodies across the European Union. First, the SEA (Single 
European Act) and Second Banking Directive, established and implemented from 
the later part of the 1980s to the early 1990s, served as important foundations to the 
EU’s regulatory and supervisory framework. Second, the FSAP (Financial Services 
Action Plan) as wel as the four levels of the Lamfalussy process and its 
implications played vital roles in constructing the EU’s framework of regulation 
and supervision.
Folowing these first steps, the High Level Group, chaired by Mr. de Larosière, 
published the framework for a new cross-sector supervisory system designed to 
safeguard Europe’s financial stabilityix). It positively impacts the EU’s financial 
stability. The report begins with very strict recognition for this global financial 
crisis. This framework envisioned a central role for the chairperson of ESRC 
(European Systemic Risk Council) as the governor of the ECB (European Central 
Bank); namely, the ECB would play a core role. It also caled for the ESRC to issue 
an early warning of risk to ESFS (European System of Financial Supervision). This 
reflects an‘ex-ante prevention’approach to dealing with a financial crisis and shows 
the importance of pre-emptive measures.
Next, we examine the situation of the system in December 2013. Curently, the 
ESRB (European Systemic Risk Board) implements macro-prudential supervision. 
This institution holds responsibility of summarizing the overal situation, and it 
monitors and makes assessments on the risks to financial stability. It also keeps an 
eye out for early indications of systemic risks that could contribute to accumulation. 
After the global financial crisis, this macro-prudential policy seems to be even more 
significant in the main advanced central banks. The ESRB’s creation may act in 
concert with that of the FSB (Financial Stability Board) at the G20 level. This 
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reflects the increasing trend of multinational level initiatives outside the EU. It 
reflects the development that‘substantive’political cooperation is not bilateral but 
multilateral; in other words, the power constraints operating on member states, 
hardly or softly, were implemented in response to real economic pressures and 
brought a sense of tension. In addition, it reflects the facts that the world has 
increasingly commoditized the need for financial regulation, and the financial 
regulation gradualy becomes level with diversity.
In contrast, the ESFS plays the role of micro-prudential supervision. This is 
system holds the domain of supervision for each individual credit institution. The 
ESFS consists of a network binding the supervisory authorities of EU member 
countries, and is managed through cooperation with ESAs (European Supervisory 
Authorities), which consist of the EBA (European Banking Authority) in London, 
the EIOPA (European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority) in Frankfurt 
and the ESMA (European Securities and Markets Authority) in Paris. Therefore, 
these institutions are largely afected by the de Larosière Report.
2. The approach of a Banking Union
Next, we wil review the fundamentals of a banking union, or in French,‘une 
union bancaire’. A banking union has as important a role to play as the EMU 
(Economic and Monetary Union) and fiscal cooperation. Its main tenets are 
construction of pan-European supervision, a single-resolution measure and 
harmonisation of national deposit guarantee schemes. The Banking Union project 
therefore consists of three pilars, namely, SSM, SRM and a Common DGS 
(Deposit Guarantee Scheme) (Figure 2). Spain’s banking crisis has placed 
particular impetus behind the Banking Union project as one of Spain’s major banks, 
Bankia, needed to be rescued from its non-performing loan problem. In addition, 
Spain’s sovereign risk of state triggered the Eurozone’s overal sovereign debt crisis.
It must be pointed out that as measure of sovereign debt problem, European 
sovereign debt markets have‘high openness’, which is a high contrast to the JGB 
(Japanese Government Bond) market. In addition, because fiscal policies basicaly 
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depend on the autonomy of member states, market participants can continue to 
exploit a gap between expectation and reality. By the mechanism, the element of 
risk contributes to extraordinary rise of the yield from national bonds. In contrast, 
US national bonds are largely held by Asian authorities such as China and Japan for 
the holding as foreign reserves. So the characters of these markets substantialy 
difer. The openness of the European bond markets generates a situation of 
continued acceptance of market pressures at al times.
The proposal for a Banking Union was first presented in ful in June 2012. The 
document proposed by the European Commission is a vital reference; namely, the 
European Commission (2012) (Brussels, XXX COM (2012) 280/3), Proposal for a 
Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a framework 
for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firmsx).
Its main points are the folowing. The document sets up the efective recovery of 
banking sector and a framework for resolution. Originaly, bank and investment 
firms operating as credit institutions supplied vital and essential services for 
consumers, industries and overal economies, such as holding deposits, lending and 
operating a payment system. Because these operations are based on credit, once 
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customers or counterparties lose confidence in the competence of payment 
obligations, the credit institution’s financial operations must become immediately 
invisible. If the bank fails, the document depicts how the bank wil gradualy end its 
operations along with ordinary bankruptcy procedure. However, on the other hand, 
the document sounds a warning when a single bank’s problem could be possibly 
spread to the overal system due to increasing interdependency among credit 
institutions.
The document further states that certain cases from can be exempt from ordinary 
bankruptcy procedures owing to the systemic risk posed by the individual credit 
institutions and important functions such as financial operations. The report also 
indentifies the lack of efective tools for credit institutions on the verge of crisis, 
which led to the frequent demands for injections of public funds for the recovery of 
credit. Curently, public funds could be injected into relatively smal credit 
institutions to prevent heavy damage in real economy or forestal the‘domino 
phenomenon’. For this reason, a tool is required to enable banking resolution in an 
orderly manner and avoid contagion from spreading to other institutions.
The political framework of the Banking Union gives the supervisory authorities 
responsibility for overseeing the overal health of the system through the folowing 
common efective tools an competences: (1) to‘pre-emptively’deal with banking 
crises, (2) to implement safeguards for financial stability and (3) to minimize 
taxpayers’exposure to losses. Particularly, the document frequently highlights the 
third point in relation to fiscal stringency.
Finaly, I mention the four concrete tools for banking resolution. First, the sale of 
business; this means the sale of targeted credit institutions, or the sale of al or part 
of its operations (however, it doesn’t need approval by stake holders), and as much 
as possible, the authority would sel the targeted credit institution or part of its 
operations on the market. Second, the idea of a bridge institution, where the 
authority would require targeted credit institution to transmit al or part of its 
operations to an oficial management institution. The bridge institution needs a 
license along with a CRD (Capital Requirement Directive). If the market condition 
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is put into place, the authority would sel the operation to the private sector. Third, 
the asset separation;  a problematic asset would be transmited to an asset vehicle 
and be managed within the vehicle. The asset would be transmited to the market 
and, in the long term, grow in economic value. To minimize competitive distortion 
and the risk of moral hazard, the tool should be utilized in tandem with other tools. 
Fourth, the bail-in, which means that the price of a claim held by an unsecured 
creditor of credit institution in failure would be devaluated and the requirement of 
debt satisfaction would be converted to stock. Herein, the authority could produce 
considerable flexibility in the resolution of large, complex financial institutions.
In addition, the document presented by the European Commission in September 
2012 provides regulations for strengthening the ECB’s regulatory power in detail, 
and importantly, it includes the implication for the future in ful. The European 
Commission’s (2012) Proposal for a COUNCIL REGULATION xi) draws up a 
detailed mandate for the ECB and the legal foundation, such as in Article 127(6) 
and in Article 132 of TFEU (Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union).
Ⅳ　A solution for Europe’s financial and sovereign crisis through
　　　financial supervision 
1. Searching for a new prospective ideal of EMU
In this chapter, we wil examine the issue of financial regulation from the 
viewpoint of big picture in dealing with the Eurozone crisis (Figure 3). A summit 
meeting was held in Rome on 22 June 2012, atended by Germany, France, Italy and 
Spain and chaired by Mr. Monti, former prime minister of Republic of Italy. This 
meeting’s agenda discussed funding‘growth’by the amount of 130 milion euros. 
This decision seemed to reflect recognition that simply restoring fiscal health was 
not suficient. France’s change in political administration in the last month had 
impacted the situation, so they examined how to reconcile growth policies with 
budgetary restrictions. They also considered the positive utilization of the EIB 
(European Investment Bank), by which EU member states would fund an increase 
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its capital, and it would loan to infrastructure and clean energy projects. In addition, 
utilization of SF (Struetural Funds) was discussed (approximately 55 bilion euros 
for job creation), and the agenda also included a discussion on the revaluation and 
improved utilization of procurement and lending by policy finance institutions. 
These topics show new directions of thought on SF particularly that for corecting 
Eurozone imbalances, SF should be utilized more flexibly.
Next we wil discuss with the EU’s approach towards‘a Genuine Economic and 
Monetary Union’, a document submited by Helman Van Rompuy, chairman of 
European Council, on 26 June 2012xi). It examined how such a union could 
contribute to the EMU’s future with a focus on growth, jobs and stability. It 
presented the architecture to build a stronger and more robust EMU through 
integrating the financial sector, fiscal maters and economic policy. However, it 
cautions that these factors should be supported by strengthened‘democratic 
legitimacy’and‘accountability’. Banque de France’s Governor, Mr. Christian Noyer, 
cautions that in terms of‘accountability’, the domain of exchange rate policy and 
the power in the relationship between the ECB and ECOFIN (Economic and 
Financial Afairs) Council pose vital and sensitive issuesxii). Recently, the 
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importance of accountability has naturaly arisen even more on the side of publicity 
given to monetary policy by advanced central banks. This reflects the organization’s 
legal position as a central bank and its responsibility for accountability to its own 
parliament. As mentioned above, the documents show that a longer term perspective 
is necessary for considering and monitoring future issues to enable a breakthrough 
in the curent situation.
The Eurozone does possess a high degree of diversity; the European Council 
(2012) said with certainty that in this context, policy planning at the‘nation state 
level’was the most efective method in many economic decisionsxiv). However, it 
also made a categorical decision that each policy could not be independently 
decided at the nation state level when the health of the overal region was contingent 
upon a coordinated policy response. This serves as evidence of a phenomenon of 
maturation in the presence of globalization, with the consolidation of the EU’s 
internal‘single market’as proof.
As a whole, the documents stress the essential need to keep‘competitiveness’,
‘coordination’and‘convergence’at appropriate levels to ensure sustainable econo-
mic development without excessive imbalances. In this way, policy could be 
appropriately mixed between the single monetary policy and the above three 
concepts to pursue price stability as before.
On 28-29 June 2012, the European Council held, in the opinion of French 
Ambassador to Japan Mr. Chistian Masset, a significant meetingxv). In his lecture 
at Keio University, in Tokyo, in July 2012, Mr. Masset reiterated the importance 
of ideals such as‘solidalité’and‘convergence’. In August 2010, Chairman Van 
Lompuy also discussed the theme of ‘solodality’ in his lecture at Kobe University. 
These two words remain key to the EU’s vision; even as it faces a debt crisis, the 
EU can sustain a strong wil to pursue economic growth in the true sense. 
2. Financial supervision as the solution of Euro crisis from a general
　 perspective
In this section, we reconfigure the main agendas of both the Eurozone and the 
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European Union. In terms of the political pilars, the folowing five issues are 
assessed in order of relative importance: (1) monetary policy by the ECB, including 
conventional policy and non-standard measures such as LTROs (Longer-Term 
Refinancing Operations) and OMTs (Outright Monetary Transactions), (2) exchange 
rate policy by the ECB and ECOFIN and its‘neutral’stance, (3) a Banking Union, 
consisting of SSM, SRM and Common DGS, (4) structural reform including 
strengthening competitiveness, reform of industrial structure and dealing with 
employment and (5) strengthening of fiscal policy coordination at the EU or 
Eurozone level, such as implementation of TSCG.
The first topic is existence of suficient facility. If we refer to the EFSF and ESM 
from the viewpoint of facility, the EFSF is a body that can issue bonds and accept 
the efect of being rated by the market, namely, CRAs (Credit Rating Agencies). 
Curently, it seems to enjoy a stable reputation; however, it has been forced to face 
market pressures on a continuous basis. The EFSF transmited to the ESM in 
October 2012. However, the transmission seemed to limit lending capability at the 
real level as a sole body. This leads to the IMF serving as the global LLR (Lender of 
Last Resort). This point was clearly apparent in that when dealing with the 
Eurozone crisis, the European Commission, ECB and IMF always made a troika. 
Furthermore, due to the growing power of international assertiveness and funding 
supply of emerging economies, the IMF can continue to lend despite global 
financial crisis. However, because of the strong conditionality that the IMF imposes, 
its facility is not realy comparable in substance to that of the ESM. Our historical 
experience tels us that the EMF, as mentioned above, and the AMF (Asian 
Monetary Fund), were both good ideas that did not translate into reality.
The discussion wil now move on to the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and 
Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union (TSCG), signed on 2 March 
2012xvi). In the EU, 25 countries have signed with the curent exceptions of the 
United Kingdom and Czech Republic. In particular, Article 3 in the Part 3‘FISCAL 
COMPACT’needs to be examined. The TSCG mentions several pilars of such a 
compact: (1) maintaining fiscal discipline and re-strengthening coordination on 
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economic policy, which means establishment of a‘balanced budget rule’, (2) 
lowering the limit of‘structural deficit’to 0.5%, (3) stipulating that signatory 
counties have a mission to accomplish swift‘convergence’as a medium-term target 
and (4) specifying that the TSCG’s purpose wil be incorporated into the 
fundamental law of the EU, namely, the Lisbon Treaty. The last pilar is essential 
given the intention of harmonisation stated by the fundamental treaty of the EU.
The third topic is the efect of BIS capital requirements and the impact of Basel 
Ⅲ as an event, which, from a macro viewpoint, is inextricably bound with financial 
regulation; namely, a bank’s capital problem is defined by capital regulations from 
Basel (or BCBS: Basel Commitee of Banking Supervision). Basel Ⅲ, published by 
BCBS in December 2010, reached to accordancexvi). It stipulates that the minimum 
required Common Equity Tier 1 such as common stock etc. is 4.5% par risk asset. 
However, this measure comes into efect after 2015 and wil be implemented as 
transition measures such as 3.5% in 2013 and 4.0% in 2014. The minimum required 
Tier 1 Capital is determined to be 6.0%. As mentioned above, it becomes efective 
after 2015 and is implemented in stages of 4.5% in 2013 and 5.5% in 2014. In sum, 
core capital strength is essential and a bufer for emergency situation should be 
prepared. These requirements harmonise the stress test, or the degree of tolerance 
for stress, as implemented in the US and the EU. It must also apply to private 
banking activities. Therefore, it has strong potential to restrictive the EU’s 
abovementioned growth strategy. It is vital for the banking sector to make an efort 
to assess the impact on  lending behaviour of the Basel Ⅲ restrictions on the 
management of risk in credit activities. Authorities might need to intervene to 
ensure banks undertake the appropriate degree of lending activities. 
Ⅴ　Conclusion
To summarise this article, we present the folowing four points: First, not only 
‘preemptive’views but also‘ex-post’views are needed in micro-and macro-
prudential policies to deal with emergent crises. In the recent global financial crisis, 
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the concept of ‘policy in time’ proved far more valuable than the specific ‘contents 
of policy’. In this regard, the US political response towards the financial crisis since 
2008 has mostly been successful; thus, demonstrating that‘immediacy’is more 
efective in a real situation, contradicting the critics of rapid sequence or premature 
responses. Similar to the US case, in the EU, the‘preventive’approach was 
considered and chosen by authorities. Words such as‘preemptive’or‘ex-ante’ 
appear before the fact and preemptive measures gain recognition. However, not just 
an in-time approach, but also ex-post measures could be stronger and implementing 
ex-post measures in a‘preemptive’manner has appeared successfuly in the 
Eurozone’s political decisions.
Second, the Banking Union is a breakthrough project. For banks that have 
outstanding‘publicity’ (or require a license) in any other credit institution, it would 
unionise the resolution tools and reduce the burden on the taxpayer. On this point, 
we need to show the type of resolution or rescue in Continental Europe are similar 
to the‘ring fence’measures used in the UKxvii). This European type of resolution is 
designed to resolve problems with credit institution in an orderly manner with clear 
systematization. Furthermore, it is a distinction to think primarily of total‘cost 
reduction’. The US political response to the recent crisis indicates the opportunity 
for the general mobilization of al possible policies. So, the American response 
forms a contrast to Europe’s. In the future, the European response could serve as a 
global standard in resolution and financial regulation.
Third, in the future, we could think that central banks would play a more 
significant role not only for price and financial stability, but also play a central role 
as a supervisory institution. Originaly, administrative order can be issued by the 
government, however, from now on, we think an order by the central bank could be 
similar to an administrative one because the independence of central bank is assured 
de jure. It is possible that central banks are given such influence in advanced 
economies due to the central role of ECB as a key pan-Eurozone supervisor of 128 
measure banks directly in the SSM.
As observed, the Banking Union proposal has relatively high feasibility in 
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comparison to fiscal union. To complement the ECB’s non-standard monetary 
policy and member states’fiscal coordination and structural policies, the Banking 
Union is essential to make a genuine EMU, as part of not just the common concrete 
vision but also its implementation.
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Notes
　 i) In English and in French, it is caled‘a banking union’and‘une union bancaire’, 
respectively.
　 i) European Commission (2013), Statement by President Barroso and Commissioner 
Barnier folowing the European Parliament’s vote on the creation of the Single 
Supervisory Mechanism for the eurozone, Brussels, 12 September.
　 ii) International Monetary Fund-The World Bank Group (2012), 2012 Annual Meetings: 
Program of Seminars, Tokyo, Japan, October 10-13. This brochure lists the purposes of 
each program, the points of the agendas and the introduction of panelists.
　 iv) Professor Yasuo Gonjo recently published a comprehensive vital book on the use of 
various and precious Archives. Gonjo (2013), The historical origin of monetary 
integration: The great transformation of the capitalism world and choices by Europe, 
Nihonkeizaihyoronsya, Tokyo (in Japanese).
　 v) In detail, Sato (2003) refered to the point.
　 vi) Mehnert-Meland, R. (1995), Central Bank to the European Union: European Monetary 
Institute, European System of Central Banks, European Central Bank, Structures, Tasks 
and Functions, Kluwer Law International, pp. 5-6.
 vi) Archives de la Banque de France, 1489200201/6. Procès-verbal de la 223e séance du 
Comité des Gouverneurs des Banques Centrales des États membres de la Communauté 
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Économique Européenne, tenue à Bâle, le mardi 8 mars 1988.
 vii) Archives de la Banque de France, 1373201001/4. Les Déséquilibrés Intracommunautaires 
de Balances des Paiements, 23 novembre 1989.
  ix) The high-level group on financial supervision in the EU (Chaired by Jacques de Larosiére 
(2009), Report, 25 February.
　 x) European Commission (2012) (Brussels, XXX COM(2012) 280/3), Proposal for a 
Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a framework for the 
recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms and amending Council 
Directives 77/91/EEC and 82/891/EC, Directives 2001/24/EC, 2002/47/EC, 2004/25/EC, 
2005/56/EC, 2007/36/EC and 2011/35/EC and Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010.
　 xi) European Commission (2012) (Brussels, 12.9.2012 COM (2012) 511 final 2012/0242 
(CNS), Proposal for a COUNCIL REGULATION: conferring specific tasks on the 
European Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of 
credit institutions.
 xi) European Council: The President (2012), Towards a genuine economic and monetary 
union, Report by President of the European Council Herman Van Rompuy, EUCO 120/12, 
June 26.
 xii) Sato, H.(2011),‘Germany, France and Eurozone’, in Kamikawa, T.(ed.), The International 
Monetary Regime and Global Financial Crisis: the analysis by regional approach, 
Nihonkeizai Hyoronsya, Tokyo, Chapter 11, pp. 330-331 (in Japanese).
 xiv) European Council : The President (2012), op. cit.
 xv) Masset, C. (2012), La crise de l’euro et le rôle de la France, Conférence de l’Ambassadeur 
à l’Université Keio, 10 juilet.
 xvi) European Council (2012), Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the 
Economic and Monetary Union (TSCG).
 xvi) Bank for International Setlements (2010),‘Results of the December 2010 meeting of the 
Basel Commitee on Banking Supervision’, Press Releases, 1 December.
xvii) In the UK, classification as‘ring-fence’and‘non ring-fence’for rescue measures impacts 
the international financial world. In particular, the folowing three points are listed: (1) 
ring-fencing vital banking services, (2) depositor preference and (3) the framework for 
implementing Primary Loss Absorbency Capacity (PLAC) requirements. The above first 
point relates to this article. In detail, UK HM Treasury (2012), Sound banking: delivering 
reform, October. This document is background on the report by Independent Commission 
on Banking. Independent Commission on Banking (2011), Final Report, in particular, 
Chapter 3: Retail ring-fence.
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